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                                               NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT       
 
                               No.  00-3744 
 
                          UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
                  Appellee 
                                    v. 
 
                              WILLIAM COLON, 
 
       Appellant 
 
 
           On Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered in the  
                  United States District Court 
                 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
                          Crim. No. 98-00587-005 
                     District Judge: Hon. Anita B. Brody 
 
               Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1 
                       February 12, 2002 
              Before: Mansmann, McKee and Barry, Circuit Judges 
 
                        (Filed: February 26, 2002) 
 
                                      
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
 
McKee, Circuit Judge. 
William Colon was convicted of various charges related to his involvement 
in a 
cocaine distribution conspiracy, and sentenced to 360 months 
incarceration.  On appeal he 
argues that the prosecution considered the race of a perspective juror in 
exercising two 
peremptory challenges in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
(1986); and that 
the district court improperly enhanced his sentence based upon 68 
kilograms of cocaine 
that were attributed to him in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466 (2000).  
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
                               I. 
As we write only for the parties, a recitation of the facts is not 
necessary except 
insofar as is necessary to our brief discussion. Colon argues that the 
prosecution's use of 
peremptory challenges to strike two Black venirepersons - Juror no. 22 and 
Juror no. 41 -  
was motivated by the race of those potential jurors, and therefore 
improper under Batson.  
The prosecution explained that it struck Juror No. 22 because he was a 
social worker, and 
because he appeared openly hostile to jury service.  Colon contends that 
striking a juror 
due to his line of work should invite special scrutiny from the courts.  
He also takes 
exception with the prosecution's claim that Juror no. 22 was hostile to 
jury service.  
The prosecution explained that it struck Juror no. 41 because she worked 
for a city 
councilwoman. Colon argues that the transcript states "indiscernible" for 
part of the 
prosecution's explanation and thus it is unclear from the record why 
working for the 
particular councilwoman would justify a peremptory strike. He argues that 
the district 
court should have inquired into the particular juror's duties, and 
relationship with the 
councilwoman, and suggests that the facially neutral explanation for 
striking both these 
jurors was merely a pretext for the kind of bias that Batson prohibits. 
In Batson, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection clause forbids 
a state 
from using peremptory strikes to remove jurors from the jury pool solely 
based upon race. 
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.  A defendant seeking to establish a Batson 
violation must, 
therefore, establish a discriminatory intent on the part of the 
prosecutor. See Hernandez v. 
New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991), citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. 
Hous. Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977).  
          [T]he defendant must make a prima facie showing that the 
          prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis 
          of race.  Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the 
          burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral 
          explanation for striking the jurors in question.  Finally, the 
          trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried 
          his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.   
 
Hernandez, 500 U.S. 358-59 (citations omitted); see also Riley v. Taylor, 
277 F.3d 261, 
275 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc).  
     Therefore, once a defendant establishes a prima facie case of a 
Batson violation, 
the inquiry "focuses on the facial validity of the prosecutor's 
explanation."  United States 
v. Casper, 956 F.2d 416, 418 (3d Cir. 1992).   "A neutral explanation. . . 
means an 
explanation based on something other than the race of the juror."  
Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d at 
392, quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360.  A prosecutor must provide a 
"clear and 
reasonably specific" reason for his/her decision, in order to rebut the 
defendant's charge 
of bias.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20.  However, the explanation need not 
rise to the level 
of constituting "just cause."  Casper, 956 F.2d at 418, citing Batson, 476 
U.S. at 97.  
Rather, a proffered explanation will be deemed race-neutral unless it 
inherently reveals 
discriminatory intent.  See Casper, 956 F.2d at 418, citing Hernandez, 500 
U.S. at 360.   
     Moreover, inasmuch as litigators will rarely, if ever, reveal direct 
evidence of 
discriminatory intent, the trial court's analysis of the prosecutor's 
explanation will largely 
rest on an evaluation of the credibility and demeanor of the prosecutor.  
Since first-hand 
observations are critical, the trial court is afforded great deference in 
its findings.  See id. 
at 418, citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364. 
     Based upon our review of the record here, we can not conclude that 
the district 
court's factual determination of the prosecutor's motivation in striking 
these two jurors 
was clearly erroneous. During voir dire, Juror no. 22 stated: "I'm a 
contract DHS, 
Department of Human Services worker.  I work with probably the negative 
side of this.  I 
have 13 client mothers who are all on the verge of losing their kids 
because of drugs and 
alcohol.  That's the work I do everyday."  Supp. App. at 2.   The juror's 
occupation 
therefore could certainly suggest a mind set that would cause a prosecutor 
to exercise a 
peremptory strike.  See e.g. United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554, 569 
(7th Cir. 2000); 
United States v. Jones, 195 F.3d 371, 381 (8th Cir. 1999); United States 
v. Griffin, 194 
F.3d 805, 825 (7th Cir. 1999).   
     Moreover, although Colon takes exception to the prosecutor's 
explanation that 
Juror no. 22 was "hostile,"  the record confirms that the juror did 
express reservations 
about jury service and told the court that serving would be a "hardship 
for me because by 
law I'm required to see my clients at least so many hours per week."  
Supp. App. at 3.  
Accordingly, we find that the district court did not clearly err in 
accepting the 
prosecution's explanation for striking Juror no. 22. 
     The record contains the following explanation for striking Juror no. 
41: 
                              [The Prosecutor]:   Your Honor, she was 
stricken for who 
                              she works for a councilwoman who 
                              (indiscernible). 
                              The Court:          Okay, what's your 
response? 
                              [Defense Counsel]:  Your Honor, I don't know 
                              Councilwoman Tasbo.  I can't speak to 
                              her position on the police specifically at 
                              this point. 
                              [The Prosecutor]:   That was the reason. 
                              The Court:          Well, I think that that 
certainly is 
                              (indiscernible).  I have no problem unless 
                              you have some reason, the only thing you 
                              know about her (indiscernible) 
                              Councilwoman Tasbo, then I'd take into 
                              (indiscernible).          
           
                
Supp. App. at 7-8.  Although our inquiry would certainly be facilitated by 
a more 
complete transcript of the exchange, we are satisfied that proffered 
explanation satisfies 
the requirements of Batson.  It is uncontroverted that the prosecutor 
exercised the strike 
because the juror worked for a city councilwoman. Accordingly, we conclude 
that 
Colon's Batson challenge is meritless, and we will turn to Colon's claim 
of an Apprendi 
violation.     
                               II. 
     Colon argues that the quantity of drugs the district court attributed 
to him was a 
disputed issue of fact that increased his sentence beyond the maximum 
term.  Colon 
contends that under Apprendi, the amount of drugs should therefore have 
been an issue 
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  Colon admitted 
that he was 
involved in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine, but argues that his 
involvement lasted 
approximately eleven months and that he was only responsible for 48 to 49 
kilograms of 
cocaine.  The district court, however, agreed with the findings in the 
Presentence 
Investigation Report, and found that Colon's involvement in the conspiracy 
lasted for 17 
months, and that he was therefore responsible for 68 kilograms of cocaine.  
This 
increased his base offense level under the Guidelines to 36.  The court 
then added 3 
points for his involvement in a conspiracy with more than five people, and 
another 2 
points for using a firearm.  The court gave Colon a 3 point downward 
adjustment due to 
acceptance of responsibility.  The final offense level was therefore 38, 
with a criminal 
history category of V.  The resulting sentencing range under the 
Guidelines was 360 
months to life imprisonment.  The statutory maximum was 40 years.  The 
district court 
sentenced Colon to 240 months as to Count I followed by 120 months on 
Count III for a 
total of 360 months of incarceration.   
     Apprendi held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any 
fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 
must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."  Apprendi, 530 
U.S. at 490.  
Apprendi, however, declined to address the applicability of its holding to 
the Sentencing 
Guidelines, stating that "[t]he Guidelines are, of course, not before the 
Court.  We 
therefore express no view on the subject beyond what this Court has 
already held."  
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497.  In United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858 (3d 
Cir. 2000), we 
squarely addressed that issue.   We held that Apprendi does not apply to 
sentences under 
the Guidelines.  See Williams, 235 F.3d at 862.  Colon now asks us to 
overturn our 
holding in Williams, or in the alternative distinguish it from his case.  
We will not do 
either. 
     In Williams, we concluded that the Guidelines merely represent a 
codification of a 
judge's traditional discretion to adjust sentences within the prescribed 
statutory terms.  
See Williams, 235 F.3d at 862.  Inasmuch as "application of the Sentencing 
Guidelines. . . 
does not implicate a fact that would increase the penalty of a crime 
beyond the statutory 
maximum, the teachings of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 
2348, 147 
L. Ed.2d 435 (2000), are not relevant here."  Id. at 863, quoting United 
States v. Cepro, 
224 F.3d 256, 268 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000).   In light of Williams, Colon's 
Apprendi argument is 
meritless. Moreover, the adjustments that the sentencing judge made to the 
total base 
level did not result in a sentence that exceeded the statutory maximum.  
     Colon also argues that the district court impermissibly ordered his 
sentences for 
Count I and Count III to run consecutively.  However, the sentencing 
court's decision to 
run sentences consecutively or concurrently is an exercise of discretion, 
and it does not 
implicate Apprendi. Colon's sentences did not exceed the statutory 
maximum, and thus 
Colon's Apprendi claim must fail.  
     Accordingly, for all the reasons set forth herein, we will affirm the 
convictions and 
judgment of sentence.               
                
 
TO THE CLERK: 
Please file the foregoing memorandum opinion. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
_/s/Theodore A. McKee  
     Circuit Judge 
 
